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We build on Acharya and Naqvi (2019) to introduce a macro-financial model where the 
“reach for yield” incentivized by a loosening monetary policy in the United States mitigates 
the diabolic loop in a Monetary Union. We provide empirical evidence that the introduction 
of an accommodative monetary policy by the Fed lowers the yields in US assets, increases 
liquidity and by extension the threshold above which a liquidity shock can damage a bank. 
This, in turn, incentivizes bank managers to optimize their portfolios by investing in risky 
assets. We use a monetary VAR to provide novel empirical evidence that there is an in-
crease in the flow of funds to European assets, a result which can be attributed to the “reach 
for yield” incentive. This portfolio balance channel attenuates the effects of financial fra-
gility, improves government funding costs, and credit conditions by providing liquidity to 
domestic banks and assets. As a result, the “reaching for yield” incentive mitigates the di-
abolic loop effect.  
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“The economy has slowed to a virtual standstill, underlying concerns over the country’s 
growth prospects. Italian banks are directly exposed through their holdings of sovereign 
debt. Italian bank shares were also hit after the Fitch credit rating agency said banks’ 
balance sheets were under pressure because of their exposure to Italian government debt. 
The vicious link between sovereigns and banks has not been cut.”  
- Bank of Italy1 
 
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009, which metastasized to the euro area crisis, brought 
into light a fierce controversial debate among academics and policymakers on the effectiveness 
of fiscal stimulus policies. Many governments in the euro area intervened to bail out troubled 
banks. As a result, some of the core euro area countries, which previously had low or adequate 
levels of debt to GDP such as France, Italy and Spain, experienced a spiraling sovereign debt 
and unprecedented fiscal deficits in the midst of an economic recession. The rise in sovereign 
credit risk is costly because it destroys the balance sheet of domestic banks, as shown in Gen-
naioli, Martin and Rossi (2014). This vicious circle of banks hurting sovereigns and, in turn, 
sovereigns hurting banks is called the “sovereign-bank diabolic loop”, and the first empirical 
evidence of its existence was found by Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2014).2 As a response, 
these countries followed a fiscal tightening policy (austerity) to stimulate growth, which how-
ever caused either a contraction to the output or at best an anemic economic recovery. An 
intriguing question is thus whether there is a way to mitigate the diabolic loop.  
While several studies have developed new macroeconomic models to study the inter-
action between sovereign debt, fiscal stimulus and bank bailouts (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; 
 
1 Remarks made by the Bank of Italy governor, Salvatore Rossi, in his two speeches that were extensively dis-
cussed in the Financial Times on September 6 and October 20, 2018 with the title “Banks are Italy’s Achilles heel 
in battle to lift feeble sentiment” and “Italy’s central bank warns of slowdown”, respectively.  
2 As mentioned in the work of Cooper and Nikolov (2018), the term “diabolic loop” was coined by Markus Brun-
nermeier in a presentation on the Euro Crisis at the July 2012 NBER Summer Institute. 
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Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto, 2012; Kirchner and van Wijnbergen, 
2016; Cooper and Nikolov, 2018), the literature has not found a solution to this puzzle which 
was accentuated by the failure of fiscal stimulus programs in the Eurozone to produce robust 
growth. For instance, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012) investigate the effectiveness of expansion-
ary fiscal policies funded through a healthy financial sector during an economic recession and 
show that bank’s risk-taking incentives could reduce the benefit of governmental credit policies 
aiming to stabilize the financial markets. Kirchner and van Wijnbergen (2016) propose a mac-
roeconomic model with fiscal deficits being fully funded by a distressed financial sector which, 
in turn, exacerbates financial fragility due to the deterioration of banks’ balance sheets. This 
condition, as modelled also in Cooper and Nikolov (2018), contributes to a belief that govern-
ment default is increasingly likely to hurt banks’ balance sheets through banks’ sovereign debt 
holdings. As a result, when banks are heavily invested in sovereign debt, the effectiveness of 
fiscal stimulus is attenuated, and the diabolic loop comes into effect.  
In this article, we show that international spillovers generated by a loosening US mon-
etary policy have an important effect on the European economies through the “reach for yield” 
phenomenon, which transmits from the portfolio rebalancing channel.3 Our rationale relies on 
the fact that in theory, the incentive of banks to invest in riskier assets and to achieve higher 
yields increases significantly in a low interest rate environment where banks have access to 
abundant liquidity (Rajan 2006; Martinez-Miera and Repullo 2017). In a similar spirit, 
Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub (2018) report that international spillovers of US quantitative 
 
3 An additional reason motivating the introduction of this hypothesis is that, the US holdings of foreign long-term 
assets have consistently increased since 1994 according to the 2015 report of the US Department of the Treasury 
on US Portfolio Holdings of Foreign Securities, except a significant fall in 2008 by 40% from the 2007 level to 
4.3 trillion. The same report shows that, in terms of market value, the US investors hold the most foreign securities 
from European countries (47%), of which 24% from the euro area countries. As of December 2015, they also hold 
300 billion of long-term and short-term securities (including both private and government securities) of the four 
euro area countries under consideration (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), or about 11% of the total market 
value of the US holdings of foreign securities. 
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easing affect emerging markets, while Acharya and Naqvi (2019) introduce a model of finan-
cial intermediation whereby the “reach for yield” incentivizes banks to invest in riskier assets. 
Building on these papers, we introduce a macro-financial model where banks optimize their 
portfolios by investing in riskier assets, such as European banks and sovereign bonds, which 
have high default risk and yields due to the diabolic loop effect. This, in turn, provides liquidity 
to the local banking system and mitigates the diabolic loop effect in the monetary union. 
More concretely, we study how the loosening monetary policy followed by the Federal 
Reserve, affected domestic US assets, resulted to a rebalancing towards non-US assets, and in 
particular into European assets via an increase in banks’ risk-taking incentives. To understand 
the “reaching for yield” incentive for banks, we build a model similar in spirit to the agency 
problem inside banks proposed by Acharya and Naqvi (2019) and the banks’ incentive problem 
introduced by Stein (2002). The asset portfolio of banks consists of sovereign bonds and loans, 
while their overall portfolio size depends on the capital ratio and access to liquidity. According 
to the model monetary loosening policy increases the pool of liquidity available to banks. 
Next, we show empirically how the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet 
via quantitative easing (QE) reduces Treasury yields. As shown by Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and 
Straub (2018), this condition of low expected return contributes to a rebalancing of flows to-
wards non-US assets. In a similar vein, our study shows that quantitative easing was associated 
with an increase of flows towards European high yield assets, an outcome which can be at-
tributed at the “reach for yield” incentive. We show that when the European governments adopt 
a fiscal stimulus policy, this portfolio flow channel attenuates the effects of financial fragility 
in the domestic banking sector, and as a result, euro area governments find access to finance 




At the empirical stage, we employ a monetary VAR à la Gertler and Karadi (2015) 
model by using data from the four biggest euro area countries (France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain) to identify the effect of the US monetary policy shocks on domestic assets as well as on 
the transmission of monetary policy through the portfolio balance channel. Our approach starts 
with the traditional money shock Vector Autoregression (VAR) analysis as developed by 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996). In the second 
step, we identify the effects of monetary shocks by using the unexpected changes in the Federal 
funds rate and LIBOR futures on Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) dates in order to 
capture policy surprises as external instruments in the VAR model. This step is similar to Kutt-
ner (2001), Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007).  
Our results show that unconventional monetary policies used by the Federal Reserve, 
such as the expansion of the balance sheet through QE measures, decrease the U.S. Treasury 
yields and the credit costs. As mentioned by Bernanke (2005) and modelled by Martinez-Miera 
and Repullo (2017), this policy generates incentives to “search for yield” and increase the risk-
taking of US banks. Moreover, the portfolio balance channel is found to contribute to the re-
duction of both the euro area sovereign bond rates (i.e., the cost of borrowing for governments) 
and credit costs (i.e. the credit default swaps), leading to better conditions to raise equity in the 
banking sector. This result indicates that financial fragility and the diabolic loop can be miti-
gated by the portfolio balance channel.  
Our paper is closely related to a recent literature investigating the implications of 
bailouts when banks hold large exposures of sovereign bonds (i.e., the “diabolic loop”) and the 
consequences on sovereign default (Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl 2014; Broner et al. 2014; 
Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi 2014; van der Kwaak and van Wijnbergen 2014). We particularly 
contribute to this literature by showing how proposing a solution to the diabolic loop puzzle, 
which is the impact of the portfolio balance channel on mitigating banking fragility and on 
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reducing the borrowing costs for governments. The theoretical model also contributes on the 
works of Acharya and Naqvi (2019), and Stein (2002), who show how the “reach for yield” 
incentive affects banks’ decisions, by introducing an incentive to invest in risky or in safe as-
sets, rather than to provide risky or safe loans. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related liter-
ature. Section 3 presents the theoretical and the econometric framework. Section 4 discusses 
the dataset and calibrates the models. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 The “diabolic loop” 
The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 was associated with many government interventions 
to rescue troubled banks. As such, the interaction between a distressed financial sector which 
induces government bailouts which in turn increases sovereign risk and weakens the financial 
sector became the subject of a growing literature. According to the traditional financial inter-
mediation theory, domestic banks in developed countries hold government bonds as a way to 
store liquidity and as a safe riskless investment (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). Prior to the 
GFC, the sovereign debt of developed countries was treated as a “free lunch” investment, since 
the risk of default was unlikely to be of any concern. Yet, nowadays sovereign credit risk is a 
significant problem for many countries and, most notably for European countries. Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2013) are among the first authors who study the effect of bank bailouts on 
international sovereign credit risk measured by equity prices and credit default swap rates. 
They show that, in contrast with the conventional wisdom, some large banks may actually be 
too big to save rather than too big to fail. 
Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2014) provide empirical evidence for the interaction 
between sovereign and bank balance sheets. They document the existence of a sovereign-bank 
loop in which government interventions and bank balance sheet holdings of sovereign debt 
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cause a significant increase in their highly correlated default probabilities. Gennaioli, Martin, 
and Rossi (2014) show that domestic banks hold a significant share of their assets in govern-
ment bonds which serve as a government commitment against strategic sovereign default. This 
is the case because if governments choose to default on their debt held by domestic banks this 
will increase credit costs and default probabilities for the banks. Since selective default is im-
possible, this will increase the amount of debt the government can credibly promise to repay.  
More recently, Cooper and Nikolov (2018) study the conditions for the existence of the 
diabolic loop. They find that equity issuance plays an important role on whether the sovereign-
bank loop is a Nash equilibrium. When banks can issue equity, the diabolic loop does not exist. 
On the contrary, in equilibrium conditions, banks have rational expectations of a government 
bailout, and therefore they do not issue equity. As a result, governments intervene to rescue 
troubles banks, and this leads to an increase in the likelihood or belief of sovereign default, 
which in turn hurts the balance sheet of banks. It is clear that the extant literature provides both 
theoretical and empirical evidence for the existence of the diabolic loop. Yet, none of the pre-
vious studies propose a solution to mitigate the diabolic loop puzzle.  
2.2 The portfolio balance channel 
Since the GFC of 2008-2009 and the implementation of unconventional monetary policies by 
central banks of core advanced economies, numerous studies provide strong empirical evidence 
for the effect of loosening policies on financial assets and markets. For example, Neely (2015) 
and Tillman (2016) study expansionary unconventional policies and show that quantitative 
easing policies have considerable spillover effects on international markets and most notably 
on emerging equity markets. Bernhard and Ebner (2017) document that unconventional poli-
cies had large effects on asset prices in Switzerland. Bauer and Neely (2014) emphasize on the 
role of the US dollar depreciation regarding international asset prices and find that unconven-
tional policies reduce international long-term bond yields and the value of the dollar even at 
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the zero-lower bound. Similarly, Bowman, Londono and Sapriza (2015) find that country-spe-
cific characteristics in the emerging market economies, such as the volatility of the domestic 
currency, play an important role on the response of asset prices to monetary policy shocks. 
An important explanation for the above-mentioned effect is the declining response of 
the yields on short- and long-term government and corporate bonds, which incentivizes an in-
crease in fund flows to assets that offer higher yields (Glick and Leduc, 2012). Indeed, 
Fratzcher, Lo Duca and Straub (2016) provide evidence that unconventional monetary policies 
are transmitted internationally through the portfolio balance channel. Large scale asset and 
quantitative easing purchases affect asset prices, consistent with the results of D’Amico and 
King (2013) and, put the portfolio balance channel into work. To explain the size of the spill-
over effect, three important factors: i) the specific characteristics of the unconventional policy 
measures implemented by the central bank; ii) the degree of global financial and economic 
integration; and iii) the presence of imperfection in the domestic business cycle. Related to this 
literature, our study provides novel evidence for the effect of unconventional monetary policy 
on specific euro area assets and economies through the portfolio balance channel. 
    
3. The model 
3.1 The theoretical economic framework 
This section describes the core framework to model an economy in which the interaction be-
tween a loosening monetary policy and the reaching for yield incentive via financial interme-
diation will be studied. Our model builds on the works of Acharya and Naqvi (2019), and Stein 
(2002). To these we add investment funds that banks can use to make safe and risky invest-
ments domestically and abroad. We thus extend these works by introducing an incentive to 
invest in risky or in safe assets rather than to provide risky or safe loans.  
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More concretely, we consider a two-sector economy with a private banking sector and 
a public sector (i.e., monetary authority) with 𝐼 number of investors within a three time-period 
framework. Each investor is risk-neutral at 𝑡 = 0 and deposits an endowment of 1 unit in the 
bank. The endowment deposited by investors is thus interpreted as the “liquidity” available to 
the bank. Under a loosening monetary policy and similar to Kashyap and Stein (1995), banks’ 
liquidity increases and the available funds for investments rise as they constitute a function of 
monetary policy. Accordingly, in a monetary tightening environment the yield on the Treasury 
bill increases, whilst in a loosening policy the yield decreases, such that 𝐼´(𝑇𝑏) < 0, with 𝑇𝑏 
interpreted as the yield in the Treasury bill.  
  The bank has the choice to invest the available funds in safe or in risky projects, where 
safe projects are investments in US Treasury yields and risky projects are investments in pro-
jects that offer an expected return higher than the US Treasury yields. The return from this 
investment is realized at 𝑡 = 2, and the payoff for the risky project is 𝜋𝑅 and for the safe project 
is 𝜋𝑆 . The bank also faces two situations: a period with ample liquidity with probability 𝐿 or a 
period where liquidity evaporates with probability 1 − 𝐿. If the bank invests during the period 
of ample liquidity, the probability that the risky project will succeed is 𝑝. Therefore, the payoff 
distribution for the risky project is:  
?̂?𝑅 = {
𝜋𝑅 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐿              
𝑦    𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐿 (1 − 𝑝)
0    𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 − 𝐿     
        (1) 
and the payoff distribution for the safe project is: 
?̂?𝑆 = {
𝜋𝑆  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐿     
0 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 − 𝐿
        (2)   
However, the bank must always be in a position to meet the demand of its investors. If 
a fraction of investors (𝜓 ∈ [0,1]) decides to pre-maturely (i.e., at 𝑡 = 1) withdraw their in-
vestments due to a shock, they receive the face value of their initial investment endowment 
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back, which is 1 unit. Similar to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the cumulative distribution func-
tion of 𝜓 is 𝐹(𝜓) and the probability density function is 𝑓 (𝜓). Given that we have an 𝐼 number 
of investors, the total withdrawals at 𝑡 = 1 can be up to 𝜓𝐼. To avoid triggering the liquidity 
shortfall threshold 𝜆∗, the bank must have sufficient enough cash reserves (ℎ) available to pay 
for the withdrawals. Otherwise, the bank must pay a penalty cost, 𝑛, due to triggering the li-
quidity shortfall. The condition of the liquidity shortfall plays an important role, because risky 
assets have a higher liquidity and a higher default risk. Therefore, early liquidation will penal-
ize the bank with a very low, if any, return on the initial investment. This is described in Equa-
tion (3) below, which shows that if the total amount of withdrawals (𝜓𝐼) exceeds the sum of 
the cash reserves and the amount invested in safe assets (i.e., ℎ + 𝐷𝑆), the bank needs to liqui-
date all investments made in safe assets and the investments in risky assets to pay back their 
investors. On the other hand, when the maximum amount of total withdrawals (𝜓𝐼) is more 
than the bank’s cash reserves (ℎ), but less than the sum of cash reserves and investments in 
safe assets (ℎ + 𝐷𝑆), the bank does not need to liquidate risky assets. As such, we have: 
 𝑛 = {
𝜋𝑆
𝑅(𝜓𝐼 − ℎ)                          𝑖𝑓 ℎ < 𝜓𝐼 ≤ ℎ + 𝐷𝑆
𝜋𝑆
𝑅𝐷𝑆 + 𝜋𝑆
𝑅(𝜓𝐼 − ℎ − 𝐷𝑆) 𝑖𝑓 𝜓𝐼 > ℎ + 𝐷𝑆         
     (3) 
where 𝐷𝑆 refers to a measure capturing the bank manager’s incentive to invest in safe assets.  
3.2 The search for yield and the agency problem 
We suppose that everything else constant and without the intervention of the monetary author-
ity, the bank’s investment decisions are made based on the bank manager’s incentives, similar 
to Acharya and Naqvi (2019), and Heider and Inderst (2012). The manager’s income, 𝑐, de-
pends on the return on investments so that: 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑆 + 𝑐𝑅, where 𝑐𝑆 is the income received by 
investing in safe assets and 𝑐𝑅 the income received by investing in risky assets that offer the 
potential for a higher return. The agency problem is in effect if the bank’s authority conducts 
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an audit and it is revealed that the bank manager has overinvested in risky assets to maximize 
the potential profits and that the liquidity shortfall threshold (𝜆∗) is, at the same time, high 
enough to be triggered. In this case, the manager is supposed to be reaching for yield because 
of the excessive risk undertaken with their investment decisions. In addition, a penalty cost (𝑛) 
is imposed to the manager due to reaching for yield and the sharp increase in the probability to 
trigger the liquidity shortfall.  
3.3 Monetary policy 
A loosening monetary policy, such as the one where the Fed cuts the effective federal fund 
rate, decreases the price of liquid assets. The same effect on yields will hold for a loosening 
monetary policy based on the Fed’s asset purchases to inject liquidity into the economy.  
Proposition: When the Fed conducts a monetary loosening policy, liquidity available to banks 
increases and there is an increase in the liquidity shortfall threshold, 𝜆∗, above which an audit 
must be conducted. Based on that development, the bank has an incentive to invest in more 
risky assets to “search for yield”. Therefore, with a loosening monetary policy, the liquidity 
threshold, 𝑙∗, above which a bank reaches for yield decreases. 
The first part of this Proposition builds on the traditional macroeconomic theory which 
suggests that an expansionary monetary policy alleviates financial frictions and increases li-
quidity in banks (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). By extension, this policy increases the amount 
of funds available to the bank and accordingly decreases the probability that the bank will 
experience a liquidity shortfall event for any given 𝜆∗. There is then a lower incentive to con-
duct an audit for the healthiness of the bank. Taking into account this effect, the second part of 
the Proposition suggests that the lower probability of an audit control raises the bank’s incen-
tive to reach for yield and shift their investments from safe to risky assets. Therefore, during 
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an expansionary or loosening monetary policy, the expected probability and the subsequent 
cost for a liquidity shortfall are low and banks are more incentivized to reach for yield.    
3.4 Transmission of the reach for yield effect and mitigation of the diabolic loop  
The way the Fed’s loosening policy affects and transmits shocks to other assets has been the 
subject of heated debate. We hypothesize and provide evidence that the shock transmission 
takes place through the portfolio balance channel because the Fed’s purchases of US Treasury 
securities and its loosening policy influence the available supply of these securities to private 
investors. This, in turn, lowers the yields of Treasury assets, which make the latter less attrac-
tive, reduce the bond premia, and increase investors’ risk appetite. As a result, bank managers 
reallocate their portfolio investments to more risky assets. We test this hypothesis in the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU), with data of the four biggest European countries in terms of 
economic size (GDP): France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. These countries experienced the di-
abolic loop effect during the Eurozone crisis. Their governments intervened to rescue troubled 
banks from bankruptcy, which enormously increased their public debt and deteriorated their 
borrowing and credit costs. In turn, bank holdings of government debt caused new credit and 
borrowing problems to the banking sector in case of economic decline and recession. We pro-
vide empirical evidence that this vicious circle can be mitigated by the reach for yield effect, 
and the transmission of portfolio flows from the United States to European assets.  
3.5 Econometric framework 
We start with the transmission of monetary policy. Building on the theoretical model described 
in the previous sections, the central bank sets the short-term or current nominal interest rate 𝑖𝑡 
each period. It also controls the current and the expected future real interest rates by using 
appropriate conventional and unconventional tools, depending each time on the economic and 
financial condition. Accordingly, the central bank can influence, at least in a short-term time 
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path, the market expectations, aggregate spending, saving and investment decisions. Based on 
the expectations hypothesis of the term structure, the best way to capture the impact of mone-
tary policy actions is to examine the response of the government bond yield curve.4  
In our empirical tests, we follow Gertler and Karadi (2015) to define the response of 
the daily, monthly, annual yield curve on an 𝑛 period government bond to a surprise monetary 
policy action as “the surprise in the average of the annualized current short rate and the ex-
pected future short rates at 𝑛 − 1 periods into the future”. The surprise effect in the government 
bond is captured by the excess return on the 𝑚 period government bond, 𝑋𝑡
𝑛, measured as the 
difference between the market rate 𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑝
 and the average of current and expected annualized 
short rates over the lifetime of the bond. We note at this point that the empirical evidence 
supporting this hypothesis and the overall identification procedure for the surprise effect of 
monetary policy actions was presented by Gertler and Karadi (2015). The surprise effect is 








𝑗=0 }        (4) 
The policy rule for the interest rate is defined as: 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔(𝛷𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡          (5) 
where 𝑖𝑡 is the nominal interest rate; 𝛷𝑡 represents the time 𝑡 information set of the central 
bank’s policy; 𝑔(𝛷𝑡) is a function of the variables in the information set and denotes the un-
observed systematic component of the policy; and 𝜀𝑡 is a collection of both unanticipated and 
anticipated shocks to the interest rate. More precisely, 𝜀𝑡 is defined as: 
𝜀𝑡 = 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡−𝑗          (6)   
 
4 A detailed explanation on the relationship between monetary policy actions and the government bond yields is 
presented by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), and more recently by Gertler and Karadi (2015). 
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where 𝑣𝑡 is the unanticipated shock at time 𝑡, and 𝑦𝑡−𝑗 denotes the anticipated shock received 
𝑗 periods in advance of period 𝑡, which is defined as a zero-coupon government bond yield in 
the expectations hypothesis. 
In order to capture the impact of monetary policy on the short-term path of the interest 
rate, we follow the expectations hypothesis of the term structure and examine the response of 
an 𝑛 period zero-coupon government bond yield curve. We re-write Equation (4) based on the 







𝑗=0 } + 𝜋𝑡
𝑛                   (7) 
where 𝑦𝑛
𝑡 is the annual government bond yield and 𝜋𝑡
𝑛 is the annual bond term premium. As 
the theory suggests, 𝜋𝑡
𝑛 is a constant within a local region of the steady state. If the expectations 
hypothesis hold, any variation in the long-term rates reflects the variation of the current and 
the expected future short-term rates. Therefore, the transmission of monetary policy to credit 
costs works through the government bond yield curve. The real interest rate can then be defined 
as follows: 
𝑣𝑡 + 𝑦𝑛




{∑ (𝑦𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑝𝑡+𝑗)
𝑛−1
𝑗=0 } + 𝜋𝑡
𝑛                (8) 








To identify monetary surprises defined as 𝑣𝑡, we use external instruments in a vector 
autoregression (VAR) model. Our vector of economic and financial variables is denoted as 𝒀𝑡, 
with 𝑨 and 𝑪𝒋 ∀ 𝑗 ≥ 1 conformable coefficient matrices, and 𝑒𝑡 a vector of structural white 
noise shocks. Then, the VAR model takes the following form: 
𝑨𝒀𝑡 = ∑ 𝑪𝑗𝒀𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=0                    (9) 
15 
 
Accordingly, we estimate the Equation (10) to generate the impulse responses to the 
monetary shock: 
𝒀𝑡 = ∑ 𝑩𝑗𝒀𝑡−𝑗 + 𝒔𝑒𝑡
𝑛𝑛
𝑗=0                    (10) 
Following the literature and more precisely Stock and Watson (2012), Mertens and 
Ravn (2013) and Gertler and Karadi (2015), let 𝒁𝑡 be a vector of instrumental variables and let 
𝑒𝑡
𝑤 be a vector of structural shocks different from the monetary policy shock. The set of instru-
ments, 𝒁𝑡, is correlated with the policy shock 𝑒𝑡
𝑛 and is orthogonal to 𝑒𝑡






                    (11) 
The procedure for the estimation of the vectors is similar to Mertens and Ravn (2013) 
and Gertler and Karadi (2015).  
3.6 Measuring surprises from monetary policy actions 
In this section, we analyze the instruments and the model we use. It is important to note that a 
policy indicator variable is different from the variable used as an instrument to capture a mon-
etary policy shock upon the appropriate monetary policy stance determined by the FOMC. 
Specifically, in our model, the policy indicator is represented by a change in the 𝑛-year gov-
ernment bond rate or in the federal funds rate, before and after the FOMC meeting date, where 
𝑛 can be the one-year or the two-year U.S. government bond rate. We consider two different 
instrument combinations: the surprise in the federal funds futures rate (FF1) and the surprise 
in the three months ahead futures rate (FF4). The instruments are used along with the residuals 
to identify the contemporaneous impact of monetary policy surprises. In short, the policy indi-
cator is represented by the government bond rate, while the surprise effect is quantified by the 
federal funds futures rate (FF1 and FF4). Our independent variables are the three, five, and ten-
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year government bond rates. The Equation (12) estimates the impact of policy changes on asset 
returns:  
𝛥𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑖𝑡
𝑛)𝑢 + 𝜀𝑡                 (12) 
where 𝛥𝑅𝑡 is the change in an asset return on an FOMC day and 𝑖𝑡
𝑛 is the interest rate on an 𝑛-
month U.S. government bond which represents the policy indicator. (𝑖𝑡
𝑛)𝑢 is the same day un-
anticipated movement in 𝑖𝑡
𝑛. Following our identification technique, the instrumental variables 
estimation (i.e. FF1 and FF4) isolates the variation in 𝑖𝑡
𝑛 due to pure monetary policy surprises, 
which is orthogonal to the error term 𝜀𝑡 and, in turn, leads to the estimates of 𝛽. We also use 
our VAR model for our external instrument identifications and, for a robustness check, we 
compare it with a Cholesky identification. 
More precisely, we use a set of external instruments to identify monetary policy shocks 
surprises in the federal funds rate on FOMC dates. In line with the literature, we let 𝑓𝑡+𝑗 to be 
the settlement price on the FOMC day in month 𝑡 for interest rate futures, which can be the 
federal fund rate, expiring in 𝑡 + 𝑗. We also let  𝑓𝑡+𝑗,−1 to be the corresponding settlement price 
for the day before the FOMC meeting. Moreover, the unexpected movement in the target funds 
rate for the month 𝑡 + 𝑗 is (𝐸𝑡𝑖𝑡+𝑗)
𝑢, with  (𝐸𝑡𝑖𝑡)
𝑢 = 𝑖𝑡
𝑢 representing the surprise in the current 
short rate. Similarly, (𝐸𝑡𝑖𝑡+𝑗)
𝑢 can be defined as the surprise in the futures rate as: 
(𝐸𝑡𝑖𝑡+𝑗)
𝑢 = 𝑓𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑓𝑡+𝑗,−1                  (13) 
when 𝑗 = 0, the surprise in futures rates measures the shock to the current federal funds rate, 
similar to Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Kuttner (2001). When 𝑗 ≥ 1, the surprise in the ex-
pected target rate measures a shock to the future rate, like the forward guidance measure used 
by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005).   
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 To identify monetary policy shocks, our baseline analysis uses the one-year government 
bond rate as the monetary policy indicator in the VAR framework, similar to Gertler and Karadi 
(2015). A component of the VAR residuals for the one-year government bond rate then repre-
sents a monetary policy shock with exogenous surprises in the federal funds rate. We also use 
the two-year government bond rate as a sensitivity check to show the robustness of the results.  
 The policy surprise in the government bond can be captured by using Equation (13). 
More precisely, we estimate the return of the one-year government bond rate, 𝑖𝑡
12, as a function 
of current and expected short rates along with a term premium which is 𝜑𝑡
12. As mentioned 
above, the surprises in the current month’s federal funds futures (FF1) and in the three-month 







𝑗=0 } + 𝜑𝑡
12                  (14) 
Once the residuals from Equation (7) are estimated, they can be employed along the 
instrumental variables to identify the contemporaneous impact of monetary policy surprises by 
using Equation (10). Similar to Gertler and Karadi (2015), we use a variant of our framework 
to examine various market interest rates and monetary policy surprises in order to evaluate our 
choice of a policy indicator along with the instruments for policy shocks. For our instruments, 
we use interest rate futures surprises on FOMC dates. We use a monthly VAR model to eval-
uate the indicator and instrument choice. Concretely, the model includes our instruments, that 
is measured as monthly average rates surprises instead of the futures surprises of FOMC days 
the log of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the log of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the 
one-year government bond rate (representing the policy indicator), and the credit default swap 
spread. In addition, a robustness check is carried out by using the excess bond premium as 
introduced by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). The reduced form VAR residual for 𝑖𝑡
12 is equiv-








∑ {𝐸𝑡𝑖𝑡+𝑗 − 𝐸𝑡−1𝑖𝑡+𝑗} + 𝜑𝑡
12 − 𝐸𝑡−1𝜑𝑡
1211
𝑗=0              (15) 
Equation (15) shows that a monetary policy shock is a linear combination of exogenous 
shocks to the current and expected future path of future rates. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Data 
We use daily and monthly data frequency from Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters 
Datastream,for economic and financial variables over the period from January 2008 to Decem-
ber 2017. In order to test for the search for yield effect, we have also collected mutual funds 
data (inflows/outflows) from Refinitiv, related to the U.S. and Eurozone High Yield Corporate 
Bonds, Low Yield Corporate Bonds, Low Capitalization Equities, and High Income Equities 
Funds.  
-Please Insert Table 1 about here- 
-Please Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here- 
We choose the starting point to coincide with the eruption of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) which later metastasized to the eurozone crisis. We consider two policy instruments to 
capture the effects of monetary policy surprises within a one-day window of the FOMC an-
nouncement: the surprise in the current month’s federal funds futures rate (FF1) and the sur-
prise in the three-month federal funds futures rate (FF4). Similar to Gertler and Karadi (2015), 
our policy indicators include the one-year and the two-year U.S. government bond rates as well 
as the credit default swaps. Their responses are measured in a daily window in line with the 
literature. The dates for the FOMC meetings are presented in Table 1. Figures 1 and 2 show 
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the daily government bond yield and credit default swap price movements with different ma-
turities for the whole sample period.  
4.2 Effects of a monetary policy shock on U.S. (domestic) assets 
Table 2 presents the results related to the effects of a monetary policy shock (effect of surprise) 
on the US government bond rates. The coefficient in each column shows the response of the 
relevant asset return to a 100 basis points decrease in the federal funds rate due to an exogenous 
monetary policy shock, while each row has a combination of a policy indicator and an external 
instrument (in line with equation 15) capturing the policy shock. Note that in the aftermath of 
the GFC, the Federal Reserve followed a loosening policy to reduce the cost of borrowing (i.e., 
government bond rates) and the cost of credit (i.e., sovereign risk via credit default swaps). 
Thus, a positive response of coefficients in Table 2 implies a decrease in bond rates of return, 
while a negative response implies an increase in bond rates. We first find that policy surprises 
over the study period have generally led to yield reductions. Furthermore, the surprises con-
tained in the one and two-year government bond rates have a significant and stronger effect on 
government bond yields than the surprises induced by federal funds rate which is instrumented 
by the one-month Fed funds futures rate (FF1). The 5-year and 10-year government bond yields 
even do not react to the policy surprises in the Fed funds rate since the associated coefficients 
are insignificant.  
-Please Insert Table 2 about here- 
The results also show evidence of a stronger effect from the policy surprises on gov-
ernment bond yields when the 3-month Fed funds futures rate (FF4) is used as external instru-
ment for both the one-year and the two-year government bond rates. The most important effect 
is observed in the case of the 2-year, 3-year and 5-year government bonds. These results are in 
line with the existing literature in that a significant part of the variation of the Fed funds rate 
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reflects changes in the timing of the rate adjustment (Kuttner, 2001) and that the 3-month Fed 
funds futures rate captures, as an instrument, more efficiently policy surprises (Gertler and 
Karadi, 2015).  
4.3 Effects of a monetary policy shock on U.S. mutual funds inflows and outflows 
We use similar tests with our instrumental variables in order to investigate whether a search 
for yield effect takes place. Table 3 reports the results of a monetary policy shock on the in-
flows/outflows of U.S. mutual funds investing in four different categories of assets: High Yield 
Corporate Bonds, Low Yield Corporate Bonds, Low Capitalization Equities, and High-Income 
Equities. The results typically reveal that an accommodative monetary policy shock, which 
incentivizes a lower policy interest rate, causes significant net inflows to riskier mutual funds, 
such as the High Yield Corporate Bonds and the Low Capitalization Equities. On the contrary, 
the shock causes significant outflows for mutual funds that invest in safer assets, such as the 
Low Yield Corporate Bonds. Similar to the results reported in Table 2, the one- and two-year 
bond rates as policy indicators have a much stronger impact on the mutual funds flows than 
does the federal funds rate. In particular, when the 3-month futures rate (FF4) is used as exter-
nal instrument, the results are stronger for all mutual funds in our sample.  
-Please Insert Table 3 about here- 
Next, we employ the policy indicators and the external instruments mix in the monthly 
VARs. To achieve this, we turn the future surprises on FOMC days into monthly average sur-
prises. Table 4 shows the results, where Panels A and B report respectively the responses of 
US government bond rates and US sovereign credit default swaps (as policy indicators) to re-
siduals of the policy instruments used. The evidence indicates the effectiveness of the Fed funds 
futures rates in capturing monetary shocks and explaining the changes in government bond 
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yields, especially when the one- and the two-year government bonds are used as policy indica-
tors together with the 3-month Fed funds futures rate (FF4) as a policy instrument. Following 
the suggestion of Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002), the threshold value of the F-statistic from 
the first stage regression should be above 10, in order to avoid a weak instrument problem. 
When the FF4 instrument is used, three of the five cases have a F-statistic above this threshold. 
This instrument has significant effects on government bond rates of all maturities and explains, 
in the best case, 3.7 percent of monthly innovation in the one-year government bond rate. Dif-
ferently, a close look at Panel B suggests that the 1-month Fed funds futures rate is a more 
effective policy instrument than the 3-month Fed funds futures rate for explaining the changes 
in the credit cost. 
-Please Insert Table 4 about here- 
It is clear from the results in Tables 2, 3, and 4 that the two-year government bond rate 
is the best policy indicator and the 3-month Fed funds futures rate (FF4) is the best external 
instrument for the policy indicator. Building on these findings, they are used as the most suit-
able policy indicator and surprise factor for our further analysis of the reach-for-yield hypoth-
esis and the sovereign-bank diabolic loop within the monetary VAR, similar to one developed 
by Gertler and Karadi (2015). Accordingly, our setting is unlikely to have a weak instruments 
problem.  
4.3 Analysis of the impulse responses in the VAR model 
We now turn to the empirical estimation of our monetary VAR model which includes the 3-
month Fed funds futures rate (FF4) as an external instrument, the two-year government bond 
rate as a policy indicator, the one-year credit default swap representing the credit conditions 
and the excess bond premium as in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) (henceforth referred to as 
GZ bond premium). The latter variable has been widely used in the literature as a good proxy 
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for credit conditions in the private sector since it seizes the spread between bond yields in the 
private versus the public sector. It is calculated as the spread between an index of rates of return 
on corporate securities and a government bond rate of similar maturity. By taking into account 
the excess bond premium in our sample, we can estimate the effect of the exogenous monetary 
policy surprises on the credit costs of both the public and the private sector through our instru-
mental variables. 
-Please Insert Figure 3 about here- 
Figure 3 presents the impulse responses of the financial variables in the above-men-
tioned monetary VAR, along with the 95 percent confidence bands which are computed using 
bootstrapping methods similar to Mertens and Ravn (2013). The graphs on the left panel show 
the responses of variables under consideration to monetary policy surprises identified by using 
the 3-month Fed funds futures rate (FF4), while those on the right panel present the responses 
when a Cholesky identification process. We also report the F-statistic (18.1) and the robust F-
statistic (13.6) to confirm the validity of the FF4 instrument as well as the necessity for con-
trolling the heteroscedasticity. Regarding the impulse responses, we find that a one-standard-
deviation surprise in the Fed funds rate caused a positive response of 10 basis points in the two-
year government bond rate. There is also a positive response of 10 basis points in the GZ bond 
premium and a positive response of roughly 10 basis points in the sovereign risk which is 
captured by the sovereign credit default swap. Taken together, the results suggest that a loos-
ening monetary policy leads to a decrease in government bond rate and the cost of public and 
private debt. By contrast, when the Cholesky identification is used to identify monetary policy 
shocks (i.e., , right-panel graphs), we find evidence of elevated volatility of impulse response 
functions, which typically questions the validity of the results. The monetary policy shock in-
duces an insignificant response in each variable, and in some cases a decline is observed shortly 
23 
 
after the shock. These findings suggest that our external instrument approach is better suited 
for the identification of monetary policy surprises in financial assets.  
4.4 Reaching for yield effect in the European markets through the portfolio balance channel 
In the previous sections, we showed the effect of a monetary policy surprise on U.S. financial 
assets. Specifically, we found a positive relationship between a monetary policy shock and the 
change in the two-year government bond rate, the excess bond premium, and the one-year sov-
ereign credit default swap. The results imply that a loosening monetary policy, which drives 
the Fed funds rate down, will easy the credit conditions (i.e. credit default swap) and decrease 
the borrowing cost of the public sector (i.e., the government bond rate) and the credit cost of 
the private sector (i.e., bond premium). As explained in our theoretical framework, an accom-
modative monetary policy creates an incentive to “search for yield”. Since the global financial 
crisis of 2008, the U.S. Fed has expanded its balance sheet in unprecedented levels as shown 
in Figure 4. The main programs used by the Fed were a number of asset purchases which led 
to a significant decrease in the yield of many U.S. assets. 
-Please Insert Figure 4 about here- 
To the extent that the U.S. financial assets offer a lower return, banks search for yield 
in alternative markets or countries. For instance, Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub (2018) show 
that the introduction of Quantitative Easing in the United States caused a rebalancing of invest-
ments towards emerging markets that offer a more attractive return. The transmission of in-
vestments is realized through the so-called “portfolio rebalancing channel”. Table 3 shows the 
first part of this theory which states that a lower yield in assets is associated with fund outflows. 
The second part of this theory is confirmed via Table 5, whereby Panel A in Table 5 shows the 
search for yield effect on the European funds around the dates that the Fed announced accom-
modative programs of monetary policy (see also Table 1). The monetary policy shock in the 
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United States induces a modest but statistically significant increase in the inflow of each Euro-
pean mutual fund. The increase in inflows is found for the European equities across all four 
major countries we consider (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain). In the meanwhile, we note 
that Table 3 shows an increase in the outflows for similar U.S. assets. Panel B in Table 5 reveals 
that U.S. monetary policy shocks are associated with a significant decrease in the one- and two-
year government bond rates across all four major European countries. The same effect is found 
in Panel C for the credit costs of the European countries, where the 1-year sovereign credit 
default swaps experienced a significant drop for France, Germany, Italy and Spain.  
 -Please Insert Table 5 about here- 
Table 6 reports results for the reaching for yield effect on European assets by using the 
whole sample period. Firstly, we find that the accommodative monetary policy followed by the 
U.S. Fed was associated with inflows to European denominated mutual funds. Secondly, the 
results reveal that U.S. monetary policy shocks have a significant and strong effect on the bor-
rowing costs of the four major European countries. For example, the results from the monetary 
VAR indicate that the reaching for yield effect is associated with a decrease of 0.3 percent in 
the German one-year government bond rate and a decline of 0.53 percent in the two-year gov-
ernment bond rate. Similar results are found across the government bonds of all sample coun-
tries. Accordingly, the credit costs drop and more specifically, credit default swap rates of both 
the one-year and the two-year maturities decrease for all sample countries. To sum up, the 
results indicate that monetary policy shocks putting into work the portfolio balance channel 
reduce the cost of borrowing and the sovereign risk for the sample European countries. There-
fore, the diabolic loop effect experienced in the European countries during the Eurozone debt 
crisis could be mitigated by the reach for yield effect where the transmission of portfolio flows 
from U.S. assets to European assets.  
-Please Insert Table 6 about here- 
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In Figures 5 and 6, we present the impulse responses from the search for yield effect on 
the borrowing costs and credit conditions for our sample European countries. We employ the 
monetary VAR with the 3-month Fed futures rate (FF4) as an external instrument to identify 
policy surprises, along with the 95 percent confidence bands computed using a bootstrapping 
method. The estimation results reported in Tables 5 and 6 show that the stronger effect is found 
for the rates of the two-year government bonds and the one-year credit default swaps. Hence, 
we use the two-year bond rates as the most valid policy instrument to capture the reaching for 
yield effect. Figure 5 shows the response of the borrowing cost (i.e., the two-year government 
bond rate) to monetary policy surprises. We see that the reach for yield effect initially decreases 
the cost of borrowing for all four European governments in the short-term, whilst the effect 
dies a few quarters later. The shifts in the Italian and Spanish yield curves are much more 
pronounced than that of the Germany yield curve. This effect might be related to the diabolic 
loop which was more obvious in Italy and Spain. Particularly, Italy and Spain intervened to 
bailout many banks and Italy experienced a huge debt to GDP ratio because of these interven-
tions. On the contrary, the German government managed to keep the debt to GDP ratio below 
100 percent and at the same time intervened to rescue a limited number of domestic banks.  
-Please Insert Figures 5 and 6 about here- 
The impulse responses in Figure 6 show that the credit cost initially declines in the 
short-term, and similar to the response of the government bonds, the effect disappears a few 
quarters later. The stronger response is observed for Italy and Spain, presumably because of 
the magnitude of the sovereign debt problems, which in turn affected the credit channel and 
the financial intermediation in these countries.  
Overall, the above-mentioned results suggest that the reach for yield effect reduced both 
the borrowing costs and the sovereign risk for all four European countries under consideration. 
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4.5 Robustness check 
We carry out a robustness check by replacing the two-year government bond rate policy indi-
cator with the technique of Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) so that all the relevant bond 
rates react with futures rate surprises.  
-Please Insert Table 7 about here- 
Table 7 presents the responses of the main variables. We use the 1-month Fed funds 
rate (FF1), and the 2-month Fed funds rate (FF2) as instruments. The obtained estimation re-
sults are found to be in line with our main findings as the two-year government bond rates and 
the credit default swap rates are significantly affected by the search for yield effect within this 
new empirical setting. Yet, the rest of the results are weak, statistically insignificant and po-
tentially with instrument problems.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we build on the theoretical framework of Stein (2002), and Acharya and Naqvi 
(2019) to introduce a macro-financial model of a monetary authority that follows a loosening 
monetary policy. According to Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) and Gennaioli, Martin, 
and Rossi (2014) a diabolic loop effect took place in Europe during the sovereign risk crisis. 
European governments intervened to rescue troubled banks from bankruptcy, and this resulted 
into a deterioration of their public debt, and, by extension, of their borrowing and credit costs. 
In turn, bank holdings of government debt caused new credit and borrowing problems to the 
banking sector. Our paper extends these works by providing evidence of a solution to the puz-
zle. More precisely, the findings suggest that this vicious circle can be mitigated by the reach 




Particularly, the accommodative monetary policy followed by the Fed reduces the 
yields of domestic assets, increases liquidity and the subsequent threshold above which a li-
quidity shock can damage the banks. This in turn, incentivizes bank managers to invest in risky 
assets. We employ a monetary VAR model to provide novel empirical evidence that the reach 
for yield effect transmits through the portfolio balance channel. Specifically, when the U.S. 
Fed follows an accommodative monetary policy, we find that U.S. assets offer lower yields, 
and this is associated with an increase in fund outflows. This effect is attributed to the search 
for yield incentive which works through the portfolio rebalancing channel. We also find that 
this effect is associated with a significant improvement in government borrowing costs and 
credit conditions not only for domestic U.S. assets, but also for assets in foreign countries. 
Therefore, the reach for yield effect attenuates the effects of financial fragility in the domestic 
banking sector, improves government funding costs and mitigates the diabolic loop effect in 
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Figure 1. Borrowing cost: The movement of the U.S. Government bond yields 
 
 





























































































































































































































US Government Bonds Yields with maturities 
from one to ten-years





















































































































US Sovereign Credit Default Swaps prices with 
maturities from one to ten-years






Figure 3. Impulse responses of U.S. financial assets to monetary policy surprises.  
 
 
Responses of two-year government bond, identified 
with external instruments  
 
Responses of two-year government bond, identified 
with a Cholesky process 
 
Responses of GZ excess bond premium, identified 
with external instruments 
 
Responses of GZ excess bond premium, identified 
with a Cholesky process 
Responses of one-year credit default swap, identified 
with external instruments 
 
Responses of one-year credit default swap, identified 
with a Cholesky process 
Notes: The left axis shows percentage and the right axis shows the time period in quarters. First stage regres-











Figure 4. Total assets of Federal Reserve balance sheet (in $ millions) 
 
 
Figure 5. The search for yield effect on the European government bond rates.   
German 2-year government bond rate French 2-year government bond rate 
  
Italian 2-year government bond rate  Spanish 2-year government bond rate 
  




















































































































































































































































Figure 6. The search for yield effect on the European one-year sovereign CDS rates.   
 
Germany credit cost price response  France credit cost price response 
 
Italy credit cost price response  Spain credit cost price response 
 



















Table 1. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) post-meeting key announcements on expanding 
their balance sheet and committing to lower interest rates for the long term. 
 Date 
Program / Key 
Announcement Event  Description 
1 25/11/2008 QE1 FOMC statement 
LSAPs announced: Fed will purchase $100 
billion 
2 16/12/2008 QE1 FOMC statement Suggestion of extending QE to treasuries 
3 18/3/2009 QE1 FOMC statement 
LSAPs expanded: Fed will purchase $300 
billion in Treasuries, plus $850 billion in 
other securities 
4 3/11/2010 QE2 FOMC statement 
QE2 announced: Fed will purchase $600 bil-
lion in Treasuries 
5 21/9/2011 MEP FOMC statement 
Maturity Extension Program announced: Fed 
will purchase $400 billion in Treasuries with 
maturities of 6-30 years 
6 20/6/2012 MEP FOMC statement Maturity Extension Program extended 
7 13/9/2012 QE3 FOMC statement 
QE3 announced: Fed will purchase $40 bil-
lion of MBS per month until further notice 
8 12/12/2012 QE3 FOMC statement 
QE3 expanded: Fed will continue to purchase 
$45 billion of long-term Treasuries per 
month  
9 18/12/2013 QE3 FOMC statement 
QE3 extended: Fed will continue to purchase 
$40 billion of long-term Treasuries and $35 
billion of MBS per month  
10 19/03/2014 Dual Mandate FOMC statement 
The committee currently anticipates that, even 
after employment and inflation are near man-
date-consistent levels, economic conditions 
may, for some time, warrant keeping the target 
federal funds rate below levels the Committee 




ment FOMC statement 
The Committee expects that economic condi-
tions will evolve in a manner that will warrant 
only gradual increases in the federal funds 
rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, 
for some time, below levels that are expected 




commitment FOMC statement 
The Committee judges that the case for an in-
crease in the federal funds rate has strength-
ened but decided, for the time being, to wait 
for further evidence of continued progress to-
ward its objectives. The stance 
of monetary policy remains accommodative, 
thereby supporting further improvement in la-








Table 2. Responses of US government bond yields to monetary policy shocks.  
 
Indicator and instruments 
Government bond yields 
US1YBOND US2YBOND US3YBOND US5YBOND 
FF, FF1 0.191* 0.084* 0.052 0.043 
 (0.466) (0.483) (0.301) (0.266) 
1YR, FF1  0.323* 0.199* 0.114* 0.071* 
 (0.229) (0.344) (0.201) (0.036) 
1YR, FF4  0.364** 0.317** 0.285* 0.140* 
 (0.312) (1.183) (0.839) (0.629) 
2YR, FF1  0.617*** 0.448** 0.221** 
  (1.114) (0.829) (0.121) 
2YR, FF4  0.669*** 0.452** 0.054** 
    (2.856) (1.005) (0.220) 

































FF, FF1 0.078* -0.003 0.044* -0.009 
 (0.451) (0.662) (0.472) (0.704) 
1YR, FF1  0.086* -0.052 0.061* -0.018 
 (0.372) (0.584) (0.213) (0.621) 
1YR, FF4  0.112** -0.073** 0.107* -0.042* 
 (0.340) (0.326) (0.233) (0.677) 
2YR, FF1 0.137** -0.081** 0.118** -0.048** 
 (0.304) (0.344) (0.399) (0.421) 
2YR, FF4 0.152**    -0.090**  0.125** -0.051** 
  (0.225) (0.318) (0.405) (0.330) 
Note: Robust z-statistics are shown in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes 































Table 4. Effects of external instruments on the first stage residuals of the two-variable VAR on U.S. 
government bonds and Credit Default Swaps 
Panel A. Results for the U.S. government bonds (Monthly, 2008-2017).   
Variables  US1YBOND US2YBOND US3YBOND US5YBOND US10YBOND 
FF1 0.843** 0.347** 0.055 0.046 0.003 
 
(3.185) (1.164) (0.116) (0.161) (0.079) 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 
R2 0.034 0.031 0.009 0.008 0.000 











 (1.193) (1.161) (1.116) (0.156) (0.077) 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 
R2 0.037 0.032 0.026 0.024 0.019 
 F-statistic  14.93 12.17 11.08 9.25 7.34 
      
Panel B. Results for the U.S. Sovereign Credit Default Swap prices (Monthly, 2008-2017).   
Variables  US1YCDS US2YCDS US3YCDS US5YCDS US10YCDS 
FF1 0.225** 0.149* 0.123* 0.065 0.118 
 
(1.316) (1.240) (1.211) (0.156) (0.125) 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 
R2 0.027 0.022 0.021 0.012 0.009 
 F-statistic 10.24 9.16 8.83 5.97 3.56 
FF4 0.183* 0.111 0.131 0.151 0.079 
  (1.108) (0.231) (0.203) (0.151) (0.120) 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 
R2 0.021 0.016 0.024 0.007 0.005 
 F-statistic 9.88 7.01 4.61 1.25 0.80 
Note: Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses; *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes 












Table 5. Reaching for yield effects in the European markets around the Fed policy announcement 
dates 
   




















Germany 6.482*** 8.021** 9.458** 10.194**  
 (0.406) (0.277) (0.403) (0.310)  
France 7.039*** 8.773** 9.742** 10.300**  
 (0.421) (0.281) (0.338) (0.295)  
Italy 5.059** 8.117** 6.235** 9.122**  
 (0.488) (0.382) (0.311) (0.446)  
Spain 7.803*** 9.450** 10.107** 10.835**  
 (0.318) (0.239) (0.355) (0.302)  
 


















Germany -0.496***       -0.244** -0.122* -0.084* 0.003 
 (0.461) (0.119) (0.065) (0.078) (0.074) 
France -0.360** -0.254** -0.163** -0.101 -0.020 
 (0.162) (0.123) (0.064) (0.079) (0.079) 
Italy -0.227** -0.308** -0.202** -0.093* 0.010 
 (0.201) (0.136) (0.072) (0.087) (0.090) 
Spain -0.544** -0.345** -0.139** -0.035 -0.012 
  (0.825) (0.350) (0.176) (0.172) (0.123) 
 
Panel C: Credit Default Swaps (in percentage change) 
  
Countries 1Y CDS 2Y CDS 3Y CDS 5Y CDS 10Y CDS 
Germany -0.018** -0.014* -0.007 -0.055 -0.141 
 (0.084) (0.098) (0.106) (0.131) (0.124) 
France -0.099** -0.108* -0.061 -0.098 -0.179 
 (0.135) (0.149) (0.164) (0.194) (0.177) 
Italy -0.064** -0.123* -0.122 0.097 0.235* 
 (0.082) (0.097) (0.107) (0.131) (0.130) 
Spain -0.062** -0.293* -0.519* 0.118 0.144 
  (0.390) (0.457) (0.472) (0.505) (0.419) 
Note: This table shows the reaching for yield effect on the first stage residuals of the VAR model on European 
mutual fund investments, government bonds and credit default swaps with monetary policy shocks identified 
around the dates the Fed announced a significant expansion of their balance sheet (Monthly, 2008-2017). Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses; *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5 










Table 6. Reaching for yield effects in the European markets with monetary policy shocks through the 
whole sample 
 




















Germany 6.821*** 8.376** 9.750** 10.270**  
 (0.416) (0.245) (0.399) (0.302)  
France 7.218*** 8.880** 9.893** 10.441**  
 (0.403) (0.272) (0.331) (0.287)  
Italy 5.372** 8.236** 6.471** 9.341**  
 (0.428) (0.345) (0.310) (0.438)  
Spain 7.991*** 9.578** 10.455** 10.970**  
 (0.308) (0.231) (0.342) (0.300)  
 


















Germany -0.312** -0.536** -0.703*** -0.733*** -0.754*** 
 (0.280) (0.262) (0.255) (0.277) (0.289) 
France -0.429** -0.333*** -0.616*** -0.673** -0.643** 
 (0.271) (0.272) (0.251) (0.286) (0.317) 
Italy -0.701*** -0.742*** -0.940*** -0.803** -0.797** 
 (0.340) (0.301) (0.287) (0.317) (0.367) 
Spain -0.502*** -0.509*** -0.353** -0.487** -0.793** 
  (4.352) (0.765) (0.688) (0.614) (0.485) 
 
Panel C: Credit Default Swaps (in percentage change) 
  
Countries 1Y CDS 2Y CDS 3Y CDS 5Y CDS 10Y CDS 
Germany -0.122** -0.121** -0.129** -0.123* -0.101 
 (0.110) (0.119) (0.121) (0.138) (0.138) 
France -0.058* -0.123** -0.165** -0.186* -0.138 
 (0.180) (0.184) (0.193) (0.210) (0.201) 
Italy -0.522*** -0.552*** -0.567*** -0.475*** -0.560*** 
 (0.110) (0.120) (0.126) (0.142) (0.149) 
Spain -0.480*** -0.580*** -0.619*** -0.348** -0.305* 
  (0.511) (0.553) (0.541) (0.534) (0.465) 
Note: This table shows the reaching for yield effect on the first stage residuals of the VAR model on European 
mutual fund investments, government bonds and credit default swaps with monetary policy shocks through the 
whole sample period (Monthly, 2008-2017). Standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** denotes significance 






Table 7. Effects of monetary policy shocks on bond rates and credit default swaps based on the tech-
nique of Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005).  
GER1YBOND GER2YBOND GER3YBOND GER5YBOND GER10YBOND 
FF1 -0.041 -0.150** -0.112* -0.574 -0.829 
 
(0.179) (0.080) (0.099) (0.496) (2.728) 
FF2 -0.046 -0.191** -0.051 -1.133** -3.976* 
 
(0.180) (0.080) (0.098) (0.496) (2.703) 
 
GER1YCDS GER2YCDS GER3YCDS GER5YCDS GER10YCDS 
FF1 -0.010 -0.033* -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 
 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.02) (0.014) (0.011) 
FF2 -0.044 -0.042* -0.010 -0.007 -0.011 
 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.02) (0.014) (0.011) 
 
FRA1YBOND FRA2YBOND FRA3YBOND FRA5YBOND FRA10YBOND 
FF1 -0.087** -0.096** -0.074** -0.287* -0.004 
 
(0.048) (0.082) (0.035) (0.208) (0.015) 
FF2 -0.040 -0.066** -0.097*** -0.015 0.029 
 
(0.048) (0.076) (0.035) (0.201) (0.015) 
 
FRA1YCDS FRA2YCDS FRA3YCDS FRA5YCDS FRA10YCDS 
FF1 -0.014 -0.037* -0.012 -0.015 -0.012 
 
(0.045) (0.032) (0.019) (0.015) (0.011) 
FF2 -0.037 -0.043* -0.006 0.000 0.003 
 
(0.045) (0.042) (-0.019) (0.015) (-0.011) 
 
ITA1YBOND ITA2YBOND ITA3YBOND ITA5YBOND ITA10YBOND 
FF1 -0.039 -0.071** -0.008 -0.007 -0.002 
 
(0.404) (0.059) (0.147) (0.027) (0.007) 
FF2 -0.229 -0.092** -0.009 -0.005 -0.002 
 
(0.403) (0.070) (0.147) (0.027) (0.007) 
 
ITA1YCDS ITA2YCDS ITA3YCDS ITA5YCDS ITA10YCDS 
FF1 -0.019 -0.045** -0.008 -0.011 0.006 
 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) 
FF2 -0.010 -0.059** -0.009 -0.011 0.009 
 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) 
 
SPA1YBOND SPA2YBOND SPA3YBOND SPA5YBOND SPA10YBOND 
FF1 -0.039 -0.071** -0.008 -0.007 -0.002 
 
(0.404) (0.059) (0.147) (0.027) (0.007) 
FF2 -0.229 -0.092** -0.009 -0.005 -0.002 
 
(0.403) (0.070) (0.147) (0.027) (0.007) 
 
SPA1YCDS SPA2YCDS SPA3YCDS SPA5YCDS SPA10YCDS 
FF1 -0.019 -0.045** -0.008 -0.011 0.006 
 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) 
FF2 -0.010 -0.059** -0.009 -0.011 0.009 
 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses; GER means Germany, FRA means France, ITA means Italy, and 
SPA means Spain. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at 5 percent level, * denotes 
significance at 10 percent level. 
 
